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THE ACCESSIBILITY OF CREDIT AND
THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS IN
THE HIGH-COST CREDIT SECTOR:
A MULTIFACETED CHALLENGE
A KARIM ALDOHNI*
I
INTRODUCTION
Financial inclusion, accessible credit and sustainable finance: These terms are
more than just buzzwords thrown around by international financial organizations
and politicians who want to be elected or re-elected. They are not abstract terms.
Rather, they are interconnected concepts with profound social impacts if
materialized. In fact, these concepts can aid in addressing some of the key
challenges posed by the high-cost credit market in the United Kingdom.
However, it is argued in this Article that the United Kingdom has not yet
managed to take the required steps to advance financial inclusion, accessible
credit, and sustainable finance in the market.
For the purpose of this Article, it is important to understand these concepts
in the context of consumer credit, more specifically high-cost credit. The concept
of financial inclusion is multidimensional and encompasses an array of elements,
key among which is the access to financial services, such as savings, credit, and
insurance, and transactions accounts by those who are disadvantaged.1 Although
accessible credit is not the only objective on the financial inclusion agenda, it
remains part and parcel of this agenda. This is because one of the main
characteristics of those who are financially excluded is the inability to access
credit.2
Relatedly, accessible credit means credit that is both available and—more
importantly—affordable to consumers, with the latter being central to this
concept. Those who are financially excluded tend to be in the lowest income
brackets,3 which restricts their access to mainstream credit even though they may
Copyright © 2021 by A Karim Aldohni.
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1. See Financial Inclusion: Overview, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/finan
cialinclusion/overview [https://perma.cc/577C-BBXF] (“Financial inclusion means that individuals and
businesses have access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet their
needs . . . .”).
2. RESOLUTION FOUND., IN BRIEF: FINANCIAL EXCLUSION 1 (2014), https://www.resolution
foundation.org/app/uploads/2014/08/Financial-exclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VGL-MB7T].
3. See STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, WHAT SORT OF CREDIT CAN HELP LOW INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS? 5 (2018), https://www.stepchange.org/Portals/0/documents/Reports/stepchange-debt-ch
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have transaction accounts. The main reason for this is the institutional assessment
of their creditworthiness that focuses primarily on their risk of default, or credit
risk.4 On the face of it, it may seem that those borrowers do not have a credit
availability problem as they can always resort to the high-cost credit market for
their borrowing needs. However—as the name suggests—the cost of this type of
credit is substantially higher than mainstream credit, due to customers’ suboptimal credit risk profiles, which further disadvantages those consumers.5 In this
context, to describe credit as accessible to consumers, borrowers must, at least in
principle, afford to repay it without adversely impacting their financial position.6
Addressing financial inclusion and accessibility and affordability of credit is
not a one-off challenge. There is a need to ensure that the solutions put in place
to achieve these objectives are sustainable. The term sustainable finance is not
used in this Article to reflect the sustainable development objectives, where any
act should equally consider ecological, social, and economic factors, that are
essential to meet the present and future needs.7 Rather, it is used to denote the
continuous access to transactional accounts and financial services, particularly
affordable credit. Regarding the latter, sustainability further concerns the
continuous review of the suitability of debt and its impact on the borrower’s
financial position, that is, their ability to continue to repay the debt as it affects
their ability to pay necessary expenditures.
As mentioned earlier, this Article primarily focuses on the ’United
Kingdom’s high-cost credit market. This market doubles as a subprime credit
market, given that its customers are considered less creditworthy, and therefore
financially excluded as explained above. The U.K. high-cost credit market offers
a range of products that attach more weight to creditworthiness than
affordability. It encompasses: home-collected credit, catalogue credit,
pawnbroking, logbook loans, and high-cost short-term credit (HCSTC), also

arity-affordable-credit-march-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EYT-9YYR] (stating that households living
below the poverty line are likely to rely on high-cost credit to finance unexpected costs).
4. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR THE FCA REGIME FOR CONSUMER
CREDIT, 2013, CP13/10, at 66 (UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp13-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97WY-7RY5] (demonstrating more concern with lenders’ ability to seek repayment).
5. For instance, back in 2008, the cost of high-cost short-term credit (such as payday lending)
reached 4000% APR. Abdul Karim Aldohni, The UK New Regulatory Framework of High-Cost ShortTerm Credit: Is There a Shift Towards a More “Law and Society” Based Approach?, 40 J. CONSUMER
POL’Y 321, 321 (2017).
6. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK: CONSUMER CREDIT SOURCEBOOK, CONC
5.2A.20R(3-k), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/CONC.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TJA-33WP]
(“The extent and scope of the creditworthiness assessment, and the steps that the firm must take to satisfy
the requirement that the assessment is a reasonable one, based on sufficient information, are dependent
upon, and proportionate to, the individual circumstances of each case.”).
7. See generally, WORLD COMM’N. ON ENV’T AND DEV., REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987), https://sustainabledevelop
ment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q873-VGJP] (describing
the goal of the sustainable development objectives).
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widely known as payday lending.8 This Article discusses the successive polices
that have been introduced to govern this segment of the consumer-credit market.
It also provides an assessment of the extent to which these policies and their
regulatory implementations have managed to advance financial inclusion and
affordability and sustainability of credit. In this regard, it argues that the
challenge posed by the high-cost credit market is multidimensional and that there
is room for further developments in regulatory response. Part II of the Article
provides an overview of the high-cost credit market in the United Kingdom Part
III describes policies implemented by the government to combat issues posed by
the market. Finally, Part IV details the shortfalls of these policies and provides
argument for different, potentially more effective approaches.
II
AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.K. HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET
The consumer-credit market in the United Kingdom is diverse. Various
segments cater to different types of consumers and play a vital role in the lives of
its ordinary citizens. High-cost credit is an important segment of this market, and
it provides a lifeline to those who constantly struggle to make ends meet.
Although the premise of the consumer-credit market is simple, its reality is
perplexing. In principle, this market should be serving those who are less
financially able, yet the reality is the more money you own the easier access to
cheaper credit you have and vice versa. This troubling reality persists in the U.K.
consumer-credit market generally and in the high-cost credit market more
specifically, although its governing framework and landscape have changed over
the centuries.
As for the governing framework, since the abolition of Usury Laws in 1854,
the cost of credit gradually but steadily was left entirely for the market to control.9
The Money Lenders Act 1900—and its amendments by the Money Lenders Act
1927—introduced a price cap on interest rates (forty-eight percent) above which
an agreement could be set aside.10 The Act, however, did not automatically set
aside such an agreement.11 Instead, breach of the statutory interest rate cap only
raised a presumption of unenforceability. The moneylender could challenge this
presumption and provide evidence to the contrary before the court.12
8. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CALL FOR INPUT: HIGH-COST CREDIT INCLUDING REVIEW OF THE
HIGH-COST SHORT-TERM CREDIT PRICE CAP 8 (Nov. 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/call-forinput/call-input-high-cost-short-term-credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZV7-XV8W].
9. See Constant J. Mews & Ibrahim Abraham, Usury and Just Compensation: Religious and
Financial Ethics in Historical Perspective, 72 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 8 (2007) (discussing how the abolition of
usury laws led to market deregulation).
10. Abdul Karim Aldohni, Loan Sharks v. Short-term Lenders: How Do the Law and Regulators
Draw the Line?, 40 J. L. & SOC. 420, 432 (2013).
11. Id.
12. OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, REVIEW OF HIGH-COST CREDIT ANNEXE B – PRICE CONTROLS:
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING PRICE CONTROL AND INTEREST RATE CAPS FOR HIGHCOST CREDIT, 2010, OFT1232b, at 41, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402161801/
http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_credit/High-cost-credit-review/OFT1232b.pdf [https://per
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The Money Lenders Acts received their fair share of criticism and were found
deficient by the Crowther Committee Report of 1971,13 and as a result the
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) was introduced.14 However, the CCA only
further strengthened the market approach to controlling the cost of credit by
abandoning the statutory ceiling interest rate and providing the court with
discretionary power to intervene when the credit bargain is deemed
“extortionate.”15 Even though the CCA factored in the interest rate of the credit
bargain to decide whether it was extortionate, the Act further reduced
protections for the financially excluded. By abolishing the statutory cap, the CCA
clearly acknowledged that the market price of credit is the benchmark in any
assessment of the credit bargain. Those who resort to high-cost credit usually lack
access to mainstream credit, which makes their bargaining power in relation to
the interest rate extremely limited. Additionally, the test set by the CCA used
vague criteria—setting a “grossly exorbitant” standard and “fair dealing”
requirement—as a means to protect credit consumers.16
As a result, the Consumer Credit Act 2006 amended the CCA and replaced
the “extortionate credit” bargain test with the “unfair relationship” test.17 The
new test meant to be an improvement from the extortionate credit bargain test.
However, in reality, the test did not help consumers, especially those parties to
high-cost credit agreements. The problem with the test lies in the fact that the
court would always consider the common market price of credit as the reference
point when the fairness of the credit agreement was challenged on the basis of
the high interest rate charged.18 In the absence of any regulatory or statutory cap
on interest rates, and considering the weak bargaining powers of the financially
excluded, the market rate always favored the high-cost credit providers.19 This
continued to be the case until 2014.
With regard to the high-cost credit market landscape, it has continued to
change since 1850. Back in the second half of the nineteenth century new forms
of high-cost credit emerged—such as pawnbroking, mail order or catalogue
ma.cc/4HWZ-9ELE] (“[A]greements with rates above 48 per cent per annum were presumed to be
unconscionable (and thus could be re-opened by the courts), although the presumption could be rebutted
by the moneylender providing evidence to the contrary.”).
13. See GEOFFREY CROWTHER, CONSUMER CREDIT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 175–81 (1971)
(highlighting then-present deficiencies in the law related to consumer transactions).
14. Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, §§ 137–40 (UK).
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also ELAINE KEMPSON & CLAIRE WHYLEY, PERS. FIN. RSCH. CTR., EXTORTIONATE
CREDIT IN THE UK: A REPORT TO THE DTI 32 (1999), http://www.bris.ac.uk/geography/research/
pfrc/themes/credit-debt/pfrc9903.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7NQ-NBGL] (the Personal Finance Research
Centre was commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry to undertake this
research).
17. Consumer Credit Act 2006, c. 14, §§ 19–22 (UK), which inserted §§140A-140C in CCA.
18. See Aldohni, supra note 10, at 441.
19. In a number of cases the court considered the fact that borrowers were in the financially
excluded group of consumers and would increase the credit risk, hence the high interest rate was
accepted. For more analysis of these cases, see Aldohni, supra note 10, at 436–41 (analyzing the impact
of the “unfair relationship test”).
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credit, hire purchase, credit drapers, and check traders20—with pawnbroking as
the most prevalent form of high-cost credit.21 However, the twentieth century
witnessed the decline of pawnbrokers,22 and the re-emergence of other types of
high-cost credit. For example, credit traders and check traders’ businesses had
their heyday in the first half of the twentieth century and then went into
stagnation by the late 1960s.23 In the late 1970s to early 1980s, moneylending,
more specifically doorstep money lending, became the most prominent form of
high-cost credit.24 Major credit traders and check traders, such as Provident and
Cattles, shifted their core business activities into doorstep credit.25
Moneylending in the twenty-first century continues to be a big business in the
U.K. high-cost credit market. Further, the 2008 financial crisis played an
instrumental role in the proliferation of one particular type of high-cost credit:
payday lending. Payday lending is also known as high-cost short-term credit, or
HCSTC, which is a more accurate description of this business given that it is the
high cost of credit, rather than the length of the lending period and the occasion
of repayment, that defines them. The 2008 financial crisis triggered a regulatory
response that brought more stringent rules on traditional lending with a focus on
creditworthiness rather than affordability. As a result, more credit consumers
were pushed into the financial exclusion zone, due to lack of access to mainstream
and relatively more affordable credit. This was not helped by the austerity
measures brought by the government that increased financial hardship, which in
turn increased demand for credit by the financially disadvantaged.
Accordingly, high-cost credit became the only available option for these
consumers. For instance, HCSTC lending increased from approximately £100
million in 2004 to £1.9 billion in 2010, with a price tag that reached 4214% APR
in November 2012.26 This is not to suggest that the other forms of high-cost credit
such as catalogue credit, home-collected credit, and rent-to-own (RTO) no
longer occupy their shares of the U.K. high-cost credit market. The Financial
20. Sean O’Connell & Chris Reid, Working-Class Consumer Credit in the UK, 1925–60: The Role of
the Check Trader, 58 ECON. HIST. REV. 378, 378 (2005).
21. See generally MELANIE TEBBUTT, MAKING ENDS MEET: PAWNBROKING AND WORKING
CLASS CREDIT 115–17 (1983) (providing further context to the prevalence of pawnbrokers and their
impact on the working class); see also MARGOT C. FINN, THE CHARACTER OF CREDIT: PERSONAL
DEBT IN ENGLISH CULTURE, 1740–1914, at 78 (2003) (describing the rise of pawnbroking in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century).
22. See AVRUM TAYLOR, WORKING CLASS CREDIT AND COMMUNITY SINCE 1918, at 58 (2002)
(noting the decline of pawnbroking as a result of “city redevelopment” and “slum-clearance” programs).
23. See O’Connell & Reid, supra note 20, at 380–84, 386 (describing the rise of check traders in the
twentieth century).
24. SEAN O’CONNELL, CREDIT AND COMMUNITY: WORKING CLASS DEBT IN THE UK SINCE 1880,
at 185 (2009).
25. Id.
26. NAT’L AUDIT OFF., REGULATING CONSUMER CREDIT, 2012-13, HC 685, at 15 (UK), https://
www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1213685.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5AJF-MQBV].
APR
calculation factors certain variants in the total cost of credit including the interest rate and other payable
charges, however, it does not include default charges. See The Consumer Credit (Total Charges for
Credit) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1011, Sched. (UK).
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Conduct Authority (FCA) found that 700,000 people took out home-collected
credit in 2016. At the end of 2016, 1.6 million people had outstanding homecollected debt, with an overall value of £1.1 billion.27 As for catalogue credit, the
total value outstanding of catalogue-credit debt at the end of 2016 was £4 billion,
which is a significant increase on 2014 and 2015, despite the fact the over 700,000
fewer people took out catalogue credit in 2016 than did in 2013.28 Finally, RTO is
another type of high-cost credit that is worth mentioning although it has a smaller
share of the high-cost credit market. In 2016, 200,000 people took RTO loans
with a total value of £0.5 billion at the end of that year.29
III
DEVELOPING POLICIES AND EMERGING REGULATORY RESPONSES IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
This Part examines the development in the regulatory response to the
changes charted earlier in the U.K. high-cost credit market. Two periods of time
are particularly illuminative to examining this regulatory development: pre-2014
and post-2014.
A. Pre-2014: Market Driven Minimum Regulations
It has been suggested that, prior to 2014, neoliberalism strongly influenced
the overall regulatory approach to consumer credit in general, and high-cost
credit more specifically.30 Some of the clear signs of a neoliberal approach to
regulating consumer credit can be traced back to the Crowther Committee’s
work. Its report stated:
[O]ur general view is that the state should interfere as little as possible with the
consumer’s freedom to use his knowledge of consumer credit market to the best of his
ability and according to his judgement of what constitutes his best interests . . . it remains
a basic tenant of a free society that people themselves must be the judge of what
contributes to their material welfare . . . the right policy is not to restrict [the consumers’]
freedom of access [to credit] by administrative and legal measures but to help the
minority who innocently get into trouble to manage their financial affairs more
successfully.31

In simple terms, this meant limited regulatory intervention in how the high-cost
credit market operated. While acknowledging that some consumers can be
harmed by this approach it insisted that the solution lay in improving consumers’
knowledge to make a better judgement.
The manifestation of this approach is first seen in the CCA. The CCA’s
abandonment of the statutory interest rate ceilings and focus on extortionate

27. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HIGH-COST CREDIT: FEEDBACK STATEMENT, 2017, FS17/2, at 38 (UK),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs17-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KFS-LM5A].
28. Id. at 41 (noting that 2.7 million people took out these products in 2013, compared to 1.9 million
people in 2016).
29. Id. at 34–35.
30. Aldohni, supra note 5, at 326–27.
31. Crowther, supra note 13, at 151.
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credit bargains, later replaced with unfair relationships, gave parties greater
latitude to set the terms of their agreement and gave courts more discretion to
allow high-interest agreements.32 Up until 2014, consecutive governments headed
by different parties acknowledged the presence of some major problems in the
operation of the high-cost credit market in the United Kingdom yet made very
little intervention. For example, the former Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), in a 2003 White Paper,33 expressed the government’s concerns about the
protection of consumers on low incomes.34 However, the cost of the credit—the
high interest rates charged—was not viewed as a source of concern.35 Further,
despite identifying default charges as an area of concern,36 no meaningful
intervention was made to address this problem. Instead, the DTI focused on the
importance of making information transparent and clear, and ensuring that
consumers had the ability to understand this information. The DTI report
suggested that financial education and raising financial awareness played a
greater role in providing consumer protection than other measures.37 In this
regard, the Financial Services Market Act 2000 advanced this agenda through the
creation of Money Advice Service.38
Although financial awareness is an important aspect of consumer-credit
protection, it is not the most effective means to protect consumers from the
earlier identified problems as other concerning factors exist. It has been
suggested that relying primarily on information in order to make consumers
solely responsible for making their financial decisions is central to the neoliberal
quest for market-driven regulations and the minimization of state intervention.39
However, the concept of responsible credit consumers is based on a false
conception that credit consumers are “wholly autonomous.”40 On the one hand,
there are the well-identified behavioral biases that severely impact the assumed

32. Despite being comprehensive in their coverage, the CCA2006 amendments do not acknowledge
the link between unfairness and extortionate interest rates neither does the judiciary. For more
discussion, see Aldohni, supra note 10, at 442–49.
33. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, FAIR, CLEAR AND COMPETITIVE: THE CONSUMER CREDIT
MARKET IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 2003, Cm. 6040 (UK), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20070603164510/http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23663.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V9B-7NVB].
34. See id. at 52 (“Those who have financial problems or are on low incomes are especially
vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation.”).
35. Id. at 62.
36. Id. at 53.
37. See id. at 30–31 (“The Government, therefore, intends to introduce measures designed to ensure
greater consistency and transparency in credit advertising, so that consumers . . . make informed
purchasing decisions”); see also id. at 80–81.
38. Financial Services and Marketing Act 2000, c. 8, § 6A (UK). The Money Advice Service was set
up as “the consumer financial education body.” Financial Services Act 2010, c. 28, § 2(5) (UK).
39. See David Harvey, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 73 (2005) (noting “investors should
in principle be responsible for their own mistakes” under neoliberal theory).
40. Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the
New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 29 LAW & POL’Y 231, 241–42 (2007).
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autonomy.41 On the other hand, there is also the combination of the lack of
options and the weak bargaining position of those who are financially excluded,
more specifically the lack of access to affordable credit.42
Further, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)—the former regulator of the U.K.
consumer-credit market—in its 2010 Review of High Cost Credit,43 demonstrated
the continuous lack of appetite to interfere in this segment of the consumer-credit
market.44 The report took the view that any imposed price control would have
adverse effects on consumers and the market despite many consultation
respondents requesting a cap on the price of credit.45 Clearly, the government
accepted the industry’s justification for charging an extortionately high interest
rate and a variety of charges. This justification stemmed from the fundamental
market mechanism of pricing, where higher credit risk would automatically
justify higher interest rates. In this regard, the high-cost credit providers enjoyed
high discretion in modeling credit risk and factoring it into their APR
calculations.
B. Post-2014: Substantive Regulations
In the period that preceded the transfer of the regulatory powers of the
consumer-credit market to the FCA, more specifically from 2008 to 2012,
consumer credit campaigners raised alarms with regard to the malpractices in the
high-cost credit market, more specifically the HCSTC industry. They urged the
regulator at the time, the OFT, to look into practices such as: lending without
first adequately assessing the affordability of the credit or borrowers’ ability to
repay, the inappropriate targeting of particular groups of people with clearly
unsuitable or unaffordable credit, the practice of rolling over loans at the point
of repayment so that charges escalate and the loans become unaffordable, and
the unfair treatment of borrowers who get into financial difficulties.46 These
malpractices were demonstrated by a survey conducted by the campaign group
“Which?”47 showing that 45% of those who were surveyed and used HCSTC have
41. See Geraint Howells, The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information, 32
J.L. & SOC. 349, 360 (2005) (describing the biases which affect how consumers may engage with credit
markets).
42. For more detailed discussion, see generally Aldohni, supra note 10.
43. OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, REVIEW OF HIGH-COST CREDIT: FINAL REPORT, 2010, OFT1232
(U.K.).
44. Id. at 4 (“We have found that, in a number of respects, these markets work reasonably well.”).
45. See OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 12, at 24–25 (noting that the report believed market
competition would remedy market issues better than a government cap); see also OFF. OF FAIR
TRADING, supra note 43, at 4 (“We have considered the case for price controls for pawnbroking, payday
loans, home credit and rent-to-buy credit and have concluded that they would not be an appropriate
solution to the particular problems found in these high-cost credit markets.”).
46. Press Release, Off. of Fair Trading, OFT Launches Review Into Payday Lending (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131101180011/http://oft.gov.uk/news-andupdates/press/2012/11-12 [https://perma.cc/B3YX-KU3N].
47. Which? is a charitable organization that campaigns to protect consumer rights, review products
and offer independent advice. See Who we are, WHICH?, https://www.which.co.uk/about-which/who-weare [https://perma.cc/M4CJ-VY4V].
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rolled over their loans at least once and 57% were encouraged by HCSTC
providers to take out further HCSTC.48 Further, the National Debtline published
some figures that showed a significant increase in the received calls for help with
payday loans in the first three months of 2012, which was 58% more than the
previous quarter and 133% more than the same quarter in 2011.49
In response, the OFT launched in February 2012 its investigation into the
malpractices of HCSTC lenders.50 In March 2013 the OFT published its final
report, Payday Lending Compliance Review: Final Report (OFT 2013 report).
The report confirmed the abusive practices that riddled the industry and were
highlighted by consumer campaign groups. More importantly, it described these
malpractices as systemic rather than “confined to a few rogue traders.”51 The key
identified problems included irresponsible lending and rolling over loans, which
was associated with significant charges levied on the borrowers. The OFT review
found evidence of insufficient assessment of creditworthiness and, more
importantly, affordability by the majority of HCSTC providers.52 The OFT 2013
report also found that irresponsible lenders not only allowed but encouraged
rolling over loans, and in cases presented it as a feature of the loan.53 This earned
them significant financial benefits as the report estimated that fifty percent of the
sector’s revenue came from loans rolled over or refinanced.54
The actual transfer of responsibilities to the FCA for the consumer-credit
market, including high-cost credit, took place on April 1, 2014. This followed
from the redesign of the regulatory architecture in 2013, which abolished the
Financial Services Authority and replaced it with these two regulators. First, the
Prudential Regulatory Authority at the Bank of England is in charge of
prudential regulation and supervision and, second, the FCA is responsible for
supervising the conduct of all of the retail and wholesale financial market
participants and, more importantly for the purpose of this discussion, is also
charged with the protection of their consumers.55

48. New Which? Research exposes payday loan failings, WHICH? (May 18, 2012), http://www.which.
co.uk/news/2012/05/new-which-research-exposes-payday-loan-failings-286258/ [https://perma.cc/HE9KY5MU] (taking a survey of 3786 consumers, 301 of whom had taken out payday loans).
49. Lisa Bachelor, Payday Loan Firms Agree to Voluntary Guidelines, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/may/24/payday-loan-firms-agree-voluntary-guidelines [https://
perma.cc/TG2R-HZB3] (4725 calls were received in the first three months of 2012).
50. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, supra note 46.
51. OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, PAYDAY LENDING COMPLIANCE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, 2013,
OFT1481, at 3, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131213013305/http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
Credit/oft1481.pdf [https://perma.cc/383R-YR5C].
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id. at 14–15.
54. Id.
55. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY AND
THE BANK OF ENGLAND, INCLUDING THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY, 2013, at 1, https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243451/9781
909096950.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK4Z-4J73].
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Many important preparatory measures took place before April 1, 2014 to
ensure that the FCA not only has the mandate but also the powers required to
effectively regulate this market. In this regard, the Financial Services Act 2012
empowers the FCA to make rules regarding the cost of credit and duration of
credit agreements.56 Further, the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013
amended the Financial Services Market Act 2000, placing a duty on the FCA to
protect consumers against excessive charges, in other words, a duty to introduce
a price cap where judged as necessary.57 Finally, the FCA expressed their broad
vision for the consumer-credit market in a consultation paper entitled High-level
Proposals for an FCA Regime for Consumer Credit in March 2013.58 This was
followed in October 2013 by a more detailed and comprehensive consultation
paper, Detailed Proposal for the FCA Regime for Consumer Credit.59
In the October 2013 consultation paper, the FCA provided its detailed vision
for the governance of the consumer-credit market in general. At the top of its
agenda was HCSTC, where it dedicated a whole chapter to the governance of
HCSTC market.60 The FCA also proposed a number of measures to address
irresponsible lending without the required affordability checks and loan
rollovers. This included capping debt rollover to two times, requiring risk
warning on HCSTC financial promotions, and requiring HCSTC lenders to
provide information on free debt advice before the point of rollover.61 The
measures taken by the FCA, in relation to HCSTC and the wider high-cost credit
products, indicate a shift towards a more “society and law” based approach.62
This means that market forces in the high-cost credit market are not given
priority over the interest of its participants.
On July 1, 2014, the FCA limited the number of HSCTC rollovers to two and
required that lenders give customers an information sheet designed to inform
them about their rights and responsibilities and where they can get help.63
Further, HCSTC providers are required to include a risk warning in any
56. See Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, § 24 (UK) (substituting section 138–164 FSMA 2000 and
inserting the FSMA 2000 s137C).
57. See Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33, § 131 (U.K.) (amending section 137C
of the Financial Services Market Act 2000).
58. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., HIGH-LEVEL PROPOSALS FOR AN FCA REGIME FOR CONSUMER CREDIT,
2013, Cm. 13/7, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/fsa-cp13-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3UVMDNS].
59. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 4.
60. Id. at 52.
61. Id. at 9.
62. The FSA and its “principle based approach” had a more neoliberal regulatory ethos. FIN. SERVS.
AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 2009,
available at http://www.actuaries.org/CTTEES_TFRISKCRISIS/Documents/turner_review.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K4V9-D4WH].; see also Aldohni, supra note 5, at 321.
63. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 6.7.23 R. Regarding the requirement of
information sheet, see, for example, Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39 (UK); FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
DETAILED RULES FOR THE FCA REGIME FOR CONSUMER CREDIT INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON FCA
QCP 13/18 AND ‘MADE RULES,’ 2014, Cm. 14/3, at 66, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps1403.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SPV-D3BW].
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communication of financial promotion and how to get debt advice.64 In order to
ensure that HCSTC consumers are getting the best deal, Price Comparison
Websites (PCWs) are required to allow users to search by amount and duration
of the loan and must present their ranking of HCSTC products on the basis of
price only, unaffected by any commercial interests or relationship that the PCW
has.65 The FCA also required HCSTC providers to explain to consumers the
Continuous Payment Authority, which allows HCSTC providers to take payment
directly from a customer’s debit or credit card whenever they consider
themselves owed.66
As for the affordability assessment, the FCA developed its rules—in its
Consumer Credit Sourcebook, Chapter 5 (CONC 5)—to apply to all regulated
credit agreements including the high-cost credit ones.67 The key feature of these
rules is that they are not only concerned with the risk of default but they also
consider the credit affordability for the customer. Therefore, it is not entirely
centered around the interests of the lender. To this end, the high-cost credit
provider must consider, among a host of issues, “any other potential adverse
consequences for the customer arising under the agreement from a failure to
make a repayment by the due date.”68 The CONC 5 includes other provisions
designed to safeguard the effectiveness of the creditworthiness and affordability
assessment.69
Refinancing seems to be a recurring problem in the high-cost credit market,
particularly in home-collected credit and HCSTC. In relation to the former, the
FCA set clear guidance on their expectation with regard to the implementation
of section 49 of the CCA. It makes it a criminal offence for home-collected credit
firms to offer new loans or refinancing during home visits without a previous
specific written and signed request.70 Further, the FCA requires home-collected
credit firms to design their agent incentive schemes in the way that manages the
risk of consumer harm.71 As for HCSTC, the FCA provides rules that require
64. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 3.4.1R.
65. Id. at CONC 2.5A.2R, CONC 5.2A.20R.
66. Id. at CONC 4.6.2R, CONC 7.6.13R.
67. Id. at CONC 5R.
68. Id. at CONC 5.2A.21R(3-k).
69. For instance, CONC 5.2A.36R states that: “A firm must not accept an application for credit
under a regulated credit agreement where the firm knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the
customer has not been truthful in completing the application in relation to information relevant to the
creditworthiness assessment.” Id. at CONC 5.2A.36R. Further, CONC 5.2A.33 R requires firms to
“establish, implement and maintain clear and effective policies and procedures” in relation to
creditworthiness/affordability assessments. Id. at CONC 5.2A.33 R.
70. Id. at CONC 3.10.3G; see also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HIGH-COST CREDIT REVIEW: FEEDBACK
ON CP18/12 WITH FINAL RULES AND GUIDANCE AND CONSULTATION ON BUY NOW PAY LATER
OFFERS, 2018, Cm. 18/43, at 16, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp18-43.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QFZ6-82MY] (stating failure to comply is a criminal offense).
71. Id. at 17. See also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., NO INCENTIVES, REMUNERATION AND
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN CONSUMER CREDIT, 2018, Cm. FG 18/2, at 24, https://www.fca.org.uk/
publication/finalised-guidance/fg18-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR9X-H4N3] (suggesting ways to mitigate
risks of consumer harm).

12_ALDOHNI_HIGH-COST CREDIT SECTOR (DO NOT DELETE)

208

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

2/28/2021 1:13 PM

[Vol. 84:197

HCSTC providers, before entering into a new HCSTC agreement, to send the
information sheet that warns the consumer about the risk and liabilities and
include information about debt advice.72 The FCA explains that HCSTC
providers should not refinance where it is unsustainable or otherwise harmful to
the consumer,73 and in any case, HCSTC providers may only refinance two times,
unless exercising forbearance.74
Moreover, the FCA makes it clear that HCSTC lenders should not allow a
customer to enter into consecutive agreements where cumulatively the total
amount paid by the customer is unsustainable.75 In this regard, the FCA
addressed the issue of credit limit increase in catalogue credit, where the FCA
extended its credit card rules to catalogue credit.76 This means that cataloguecredit providers cannot increase or offer to increase the credit limit where they
have been advised that the customer does not want the increase.77 This shows the
FCA’s general concern with the sustainability of debt in the context of high-cost
credit in general.
While the FCA refused to introduce a price cap on home-collected credit
citing the lack of evidence to support such strong intervention,78 it implemented
a price cap on two types of high-cost credit, namely HCSTC and RTO. As for the
HCSTC, the FCA’s price cap came into effect in January 2015. It is designed to
deal with three main sources of concern in the HCSTC market, namely, interest,
fees and charges, and default charges.79 In this respect, the cap applies to various
types of interest and charges which include, but are not limited to, interest on
credit, late payments or default charges, transmission charges, early repayments,
refinancing or termination charges, credit broker’s charges when the broker is in
the same group as the lender or the credit broker agreed to share the charge with
the lender, ancillary services charges, and interest on any of the mentioned
charges.80 The cap also applies to any charges under connected agreements,81 and
it provides an outright prohibition of compound interest.82

72. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 6.7.20 R.
73. Id. at CONC 6.7.21 G.
74. Id. at CONC 6.7.23 R. See also id. at CONC 7.3.4 R (stating that “forbearance and due
consideration” must be exercised by the firm in the case of arrears or default).
75. Id. at CONC 6.7.22G.
76. Id. at CONC 6.7.4 R–6.7.13 R (regulating “[c]redit card and retail revolving credit
requirements.”).
77. Id. at CONC 6.7.7 R.
78. Id. at 17.
79. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DETAILED RULES FOR THE PRICE CAP ON HIGH-COST SHORT-TERM
CREDIT INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON CP14/10 AND FINAL RULES, 2014, PS14/16, at 6, http://www.fc
a.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-statements/ps14-16 [https://perma.cc/42S4-FB87].
80. Ancillary services “include, but are not limited to, services related to processing the application
and to the transmission of the money being lent, and insurance or insurance-like services ancillary to the
agreement.” FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5A.2.18 R, 5A.3.22 R, 5A.4.18 R, 5A.1.6 G.
81. Id. at CONC 5A.4 16 R.
82. Id. at CONC 5A.2.19 R, 5A.3.24 R, 5A.4.19R.
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The first layer of the cap, the initial price cap, covers interest rates and fees
and charges—excluding default charges subject to default caps—as HCSTC
providers cannot now charge more in interest and fees than 0.8% per day of the
amount borrowed.83 The second layer targets default charges as it restricts the
amount paid in default to a total of £15, whether the debt is being repaid in
installments or in a single payment.84 This means that HCSTC providers cannot
charge £15 for each instance of default when borrowers are paying back by
installments.85 The third layer is a total cost cap where a borrower should never
pay more in interest, fees, and charges than 100% of the amount borrowed.86
With regard to RTO, the FCA found convincing evidence to cap the price of
credit paid by consumers. Central to the FCA’s decision are: first, the fact that
most RTO consumers would fall within the financially excluded group, and
second, the extortionate price paid by RTO consumers which in some cases is
four times the retail price of the same goods.87 On April 1, 2019, the FCA
introduced its RTO multi-layered price cap. First, the FCA imposed a total cost
of credit cap of 100%, in other words, the interest charges are not allowed to
exceed the cash price of the goods.88 Second, RTO firms must benchmark base
prices—including the price of delivery and installation—against the prices
charged by three mainstream retailers.89 Finally, firms are prohibited from
increasing the prices of any goods and services related to RTO agreements as a
way to recover revenue lost due to the total cost of credit cap.
Undoubtedly, the level of intervention demonstrated above has redefined the
relationship between the regulator and the high-cost credit market. The regulator
no longer shies away from interfering directly in favor of consumers who, due to
their disadvantaged financial position, do not have strong bargaining powers.
However, there are some areas of concern with which the FCA still needs to keep
up.

83. Id. at CONC 5A.2.3 R, 5A.3.3 R, 5A.4.3 R. See also FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra
note 71, at 6.
84. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 79, at 35.
85. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5A.2.14R, 5A.3.18R, 5A.4.14R; see also FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 79, at 10 (stating the cap on default charges is £15).
86. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5A.2.2R, 5A.3.2R. See also FIN. CONDUCT
AUTH., supra note 79, at 8 (stating a “100% price cap” provides the “least onerous way to achieve the
necessary level of protection for consumers”).
87. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., RENT-TO-OWN PRICE CAP-FEEDBACK ON CP18/35 AND FINAL RULES,
2019, Cm. PS19/6, at 10, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VB4X9AR]; see also
Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., FCA Confirms Introduction of Rent-to-Own Price Cap (Mar. 5,
2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-confirms-introduction-rent-own-price-cap [https://
perma.cc/C6L5-C2CS].
88. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5B.2.11R.
89. Id. at CONC 5B.2.2R.
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IV
THE SHORTFALLS AND ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
Problems remain in the context of high-cost credit that the regulator and the
government should respond to in a timely manner in order to ensure the
continuous protection of consumers. These problems arise largely from two main
areas: the adaptive and evolving nature of the high-cost credit business model
and the credit supply vulnerability dilemma.
A. Adaptive and Evolving Industry
As demonstrated earlier, HCSTC is one of the main segments of the highcost credit market that received significant regulatory attention and experienced
the highest level of intervention by the regulator. Despite all the regulatory
efforts, however, evidence suggests that HCSTC remains a major source of overindebtedness in the United Kingdom90 HCSTC providers have moved to
installment loans. Instead of requiring a single payment after thirty days, the
loans are now repayable typically over three to four months.91 Although this may
explain the decrease in default rates,92 it also explains the rise in arrears rates.93
With the new structure there is higher risk of missing an installment, and the cost
of borrowing is increased due to the longer term of the loan.94 Further, the use of
online platforms and digital technology has widened the group of users of this
type of credit and brought in the younger generation, increasing their risk of overindebtedness.95
Offering HCSTC online also exacerbates the behavioral biases associated
with this type of borrowing,96 as there is neither human interaction nor time for
reflection. Therefore, it can be suggested that the FCA should consider ways to
influence the consumers’ attitude towards HCSTC in order to minimize their
90. Consumer Credit: High-Cost Short-Term Credit Lending Data, FINANCIAL CONDUCT
AUTHORITY (May 15, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/data/consumer-credit-high-cost-short-term-creditlending-data-jan-2019 [https://perma.cc/GAH9-TFAS] (noting that users’ HCSTC loans are much more
likely to be over-indebted than the average person).
91. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 27 at 24; see also STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, PAYDAY
LOANS: THE NEXT GENERATION 9 (2017), https://www.stepchange.org/portals/0/documents/
reports/payday-loans-next-generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NVJ-GKSE] (showing most clients have 3–
4 repayment plans).
92. STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, supra note 91, at 9; see also CITIZENS ADVICE, FCA HIGHCOST CREDIT CALL FOR INPUT: CITIZEN ADVICE RESPONSE 2 (2017), https://www.citizens
advice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/Debt%20and%20Money%20Publications/Citizens%20Advice%2
0-%20HCSTC.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8LG-GBPS].
93. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 27, at 14–15, 23–24.
94. Id. at 14.
95. The FCA has reported that 49.8% of HCSTC consumers are aged 18–34 (16.4% aged 18–24 and
33.4% aged 25–34). See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HIGH-COST SHORT-TERM CREDIT LENDING DATA
(May 15, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/data/consumer-credit-high-cost-short-term-credit-lending-datajan-2019 [https://perma.cc/VAJ2-DUWT].
96. SHARON WORTON, IAM SPARHAM, SAM GREW, ANDREW SHAW, KATIE WISE & ANN
YEATMAN, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, USAGE AND EXPERIENCE OF HIGH COST CREDIT:
CONSUMER RESEARCH REPORT 9–12 (2018).
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exposure to these risks and eventually enhance consumer protection. In its
October 2013 consultation, the FCA referred to the need to conduct more
behavioral research into ways to nudge credit consumers to make better
choices.97 Since then, the FCA has published a number of papers exploring the
use of behavioral economics in the credit market.98 The most recent one explored
the use of nudges regarding credit card debt and found “the semblance of
success.”99 In this regard, the FCA needs to further explore this avenue for
intervention in the context of HCSTC and its wider use in other high-cost credit
products.
B. The Credit Supply Vulnerability Dilemma
The term vulnerable is often utilized in the literature to describe high-cost
credit consumers. The primary use of the term, in this context, is to denote the
disadvantaged social and economic status of those consumers. In this regard,
vulnerability can be viewed from two perspectives.100 First, information
vulnerability which concerns high-cost credit consumers’ ability not only to access
the required credit information but also to assess and understand it. Second,
supply vulnerability that is connected to their access to credit sources, more
specifically affordable credit.101 It is the latter that poses the most significant
challenge at the moment with the loss of jobs and the rise of unemployment
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The availability of alternative credit sources, more specifically accessible and
affordable credit, is central to the protection of the financially disadvantaged and
to the achievement of financial inclusion. Yet, the financially vulnerable are the
consumers most affected by the stringency of micro-prudential regulations. Since
the financial crisis of 2008, prudential regulation has become a cornerstone of the
worldwide regulatory response. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England,
through the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Policy

97. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 4, at 78.
98. See, e.g., KRISTINE ERTA, STEFAN HUNT, ZANNA ISCENKO, WILL BRAMBLEY, APPLYING
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AT THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (FCA Occasional Paper No. 1,
2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YNE2-UJMB]; FIN. ADVICE WORKING GRP., HM TREASURY & THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT
AUTHORITY, RULES OF THUMB AND NUDGES: IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF UK
CONSUMERS
(2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/fawg-rules-of-thumb-nudges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J4NU-RHQL]; PAUL ADAMS & LAURA SMART, FROM ADVERT TO ACTION:
BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHT INTO THE ADVERTISING OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (FCA Occasional Paper
No. 26, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/op17-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/
73XU-NYVS].
99. PAUL ADAMS, BENEDICT GUTTMAN-KENNEY, LUCY HAYES, STEFAN HUNT, DAVID
LAIBSON & NEIL STEWART, THE SEMBLANCE OF SUCCESS IN NUDGING CONSUMERS TO PAY DOWN
CREDIT CARD CEBT (FCA Occasional Paper No. 45, 2018).
100. Aldohni, supra note 10, at 421.
101. Id. at 446–47.

12_ALDOHNI_HIGH-COST CREDIT SECTOR (DO NOT DELETE)

212

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

2/28/2021 1:13 PM

[Vol. 84:197

Committee, oversees the micro and macro aspects of prudential regulation.102
While prudential regulation is a complicated subject, for the purpose of this
discussion, micro-prudential regulation means simply that mainstream credit
providers—for example banks and building societies—are now very restricted in
terms of the risks they can take in their operations, and further all risk must be
accounted for and encountered in their capital buffers.103 This clearly applies to
their retail lending, where financially disadvantaged consumers do not measure
well on a creditworthiness assessment.104 Therefore, because these consumers
pose credit default risks, among other risks—which should be avoided at all costs
under micro-prudential regulations—mainstream credit providers have largely
stopped supplying credit to these consumers.
Although the FCA has been recently looking into the credit supply issue and
exploring the options, it does not seem to be focusing on a centralized solution.
Instead, the FCA is focusing on the regional level by reviewing the role of credit
unions, local charities, and local authorities or councils in supplying funds.105
However, some of these options have limited financial capacity and are not
capable of dealing with the existing high demand. For, example, the cuts to the
local councils’ funding since 2008 have adversely affected these councils’ ability
to create emergency funding schemes for individuals as they are struggling to
fund their essential services.106 Further, not all those who are financially excluded
would qualify to use these sources. Take for instance credit unions. They are
membership-based and the legislative cap of three percent interest rate per
month may prevent them from extending credit to higher risk consumers.107
This is not to suggest that social finance in the broad sense of this term does
not have a role to play in addressing the lack of affordable credit problem. The
forms of sources encompassed by social finance, such as cooperative finance,
102. What is the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)?, BANK OF ENGLAND, https://www.bankof
england.co.uk/knowledgebank/what-is-the-prudential-regulation-authority-pra [https://perma.cc/A3C89DTY].
103. For more detailed explanation of capital adequacy and micro-prudential regulation, see IRIS
CHIU & JOANNA WILSON, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 329 (2018).
104. See Becky Rowe, et al., MIND THE GAP 49 (2015) (discussing how some financially
disadvantaged consumers lack understanding of credit scores and how to improve them); see also FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH., CONSUMER CREDIT AND CONSUMERS IN VULNERABLE CIRCUMSTANCES 25 (2014)
(noting credit score can restrict consumers’ access to credit); see also SHARRON WORTON, ET AL.,
CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH: LOW INCOME CONSUMERS 36 (2014), https://www.fca.org.uk/pub
lication/research/optimisa-research-low-income-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/37UL-FNVD] (addressing
factors which influence certain consumers’ willingness to pursue credit).
105. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-COST CREDIT REPORT, at 5, 12–13 (2019),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/alternatives-high-cost-credit-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P
VH-ECAU].
106. It has been estimated by Unison that £10 billion is needed for councils funding in England in
order to carry out their social care and environmental services otherwise there will cut to child and adult
cares services and environmental services. See Press Release, Unison, Ministers Must Fix Council
Funding to Avoid “Catastrophic Cuts”, (July 6, 2020), https://www.unison.org.uk/news/pressrelease/2020/07/ministers-must-fix-council-funding-avoid-%E2%80%8Bcatastrophic-cuts/ [https://perm
a.cc/7BW7-K5JE].
107. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 105 at 9–10.
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social banks, and crowd funding, empower individuals as they try to carry out
market-based activities while delivering on important social objectives.108
However, they are restricted in terms of their resources, and when operating in
the form of mainstream credit providers they are subject to the same regulatory
constraints discussed earlier. The United Kingdom needs a more comprehensive
solution to increase the supply of credit available to financially disadvantaged
consumers. Meanwhile the United Kingdom also needs to further ensure that
those who are still relying on high-cost credit are not subjected to extortionate
costs and practices.
V
CONCLUSION
The challenge posed by the high-cost credit sector in the United Kingdom is
multi-dimensional, therefore, a multi layered solution is needed. The vulnerable
nature of this sector’s consumers adds more pressure on the regulator to act
quickly and effectively.
Central to this solution is a tailored national scheme designed specifically to
deal with the issue of accessibility of affordable credit by the financially excluded.
This scheme can be entirely funded by the government or by a collaboration
between the government and the banking sector.109 Clearly this is a matter that
requires far more detailed research in order to strike the right balance between
the public and private interaction.
In the meantime, a key factor for this to succeed is ensuring that the
consumer-credit regulations are capable of protecting the most vulnerable who
turn to high-cost credit while this arrangement is being figured out. This means
keeping the current regulations under continuous review in order to respond to
any evolution in the business model of the high-cost credit providers designed to
circumvent these rules.
Moreover, the FCA needs to further explore the role that behavioral finance
can play in the context of high-cost credit products. The FCA should investigate
how the decision-making mechanisms of high-cost credit consumers can be aided
to improve their borrowing decisions. The FCA needs to further examine
whether this can be achieved by a simple nudge or a more complicated behavioral
intervention is required.

108. Othmar M. Lehner & Alex Nicholls, Social Finance and Crowdfunding for Social Enterprises: A
Public–Private Case Study Providing Legitimacy and Leverage, 16 VENTURE CAP. 271 (2014).
109. STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, supra note 3, at 6–7.

